



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THE STRUCTURE
OF AN
EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SPEECH

BY
HARRY B. BRADBURY

T. MOREY & SON
GREENFIELD, MASS.
1915

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PREFACE

The short addresses in this small volume originally were delivered by the author as one of the members of a class in public speaking at the West Side Y. M. C. A., in New York City. Mr. Walter H. Robinson, who conducted the class, requested that the addresses be put in written form. This was done, with some amplifications, and the addresses were then read before the same class. Some of the members were kind enough to suggest that the addresses should be preserved in printed form, as they believed they had derived valuable assistance from them. In deference to this suggestion the author has had them printed privately, without making any attempt to secure a publisher for the purpose of having the work distributed generally.

The addresses themselves are the result of many years of close observation

of public speakers. To the knowledge thus gained has been added the fruits of a careful study of the works of those who have written on the subject of public speaking, from the time of Cicero to our own era.

As for myself, the pleasure, and I believe, profit, I have derived from the preparation and delivery of the addresses is sufficient reward. Therefore I dedicate this book to those friends who are responsible, in the way I have indicated, for the publication of the addresses.

HARRY B. BRADBURY

141 Broadway

New York, February, 1915

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THE STRUCTURE OF AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SPEECH

I

PRELIMINARY

If the marble, granite, steel, wood and decorative materials out of which the Capitol, at Washington, was constructed, should be thrown together in a more or less irregular pile, it would be junk, merely. Many public speeches, although they may contain golden thoughts and brilliant verbal embellishments, must be classed as junk, because of the lack of proper arrangement of the materials. Out of the same thoughts, words and sentences might be constructed excellent speeches, by the exercise of intelligent attention to the plans upon which they were put together. This is a mere truism, which is proved by the experience and practice of every great public speaker

from Demosthenes to Lincoln, and by the teaching of many of them. Yet a very large majority of men who make public speeches, so far at least as my own observation goes, seem to be unaware of this truism. At any rate they ignore it. They either think they may neglect with impunity all rules as to form, or they are unfamiliar with them, or they do not know how to apply them. The result is too often a confusing conglomeration of ideas and sentences which, metaphorically speaking, resembles a cut-up picture puzzle in its disarranged condition. Rearrange the ideas in a logical sequence and the result is a picture which is understandable and attractive. This does not involve the invariable application of set rules or stiff formulas on all occasions. Quite the contrary. It requires merely the use of certain principles of psychology and logic, which are so general and broad in their scope as to make their application a simple matter.

Do not imagine an endeavor will be

made to prove that a simpleton can either compose or deliver a good public speech by the adoption of any suggestions which may be made here. It requires a man of both character, in its best sense, plus ability, to compose and deliver a public address which will have any lasting effect. Everything which may be said here must be qualified by the last statement. So let there be no misunderstanding on that point.

But men of character, ability and experience make this mistake, not infrequently. Younger men, of inexperience, make it almost invariably. That is, however much thought they may give to the different parts and the purely literary embellishments of their addresses they give little attention, as the result seems to indicate, to the fitting together of the different parts of their discourses, so as to secure and keep the attention of their auditors, in the process of convincing them of the truth of the speaker's propositions and in persuading them to act as

the speaker desires. The whole object of a public speaker is comprehended in the last sentence—to secure and hold the attention of his audience and then to convince and persuade them after he has secured and held their attention.

The general principles which must be practiced to accomplish this end appear indubitably to have been understood by every orator of extraordinary ability from Demosthenes to our own time. But if they have ever been clearly and concisely stated, as I understand them, in a modern work I have been unfortunate enough never to have discovered the book in which this was done.

I have endeavored, therefore, to reduce to modern thought and language the principles which have been applied from time immemorial to a subject which is becoming of greater importance every day—that of conveying ideas clearly, forcibly, convincingly and persuasively to a considerable number of persons at the same time.

In doing this I have taken up briefly the consideration of the division of a speech generally. This will be found in the next succeeding chapter. In those which follow each division is discussed separately, and its relation to the others explained. In a still later chapter will be found a discussion of some topics relating to the subject which cannot be considered profitably in connection with any one particular subdivision.

II

THE DIVISIONS OF AN ORATION

According to classical authority a speech should be divided as follows:

1. Introduction, or exordium.
2. Statement of facts, or narrative.
3. Proposition.
4. Argument and proof.
5. Refutation.
6. Conclusion, or peroration.

Certainly there is nothing novel or startling about the foregoing division. It is one that has been familiar for upwards of two thousand years, at least. True, other divisions and sometimes more numerous subdivisions have been made. Great orators have sometimes made more or less extensive variations in this arrangement. But the great majority of effective orations, made by speakers of more than ordinary ability, may be thus subdivided, without doing them great violence.

After a speaker has acquired the ability to model his address on this plan then he may take the liberty of departing from it, to a limited extent, to meet the exigencies of particular occasions. Naturally this plan is applicable to what usually are termed set speeches. A running debate does not always permit of the use of this formality. But even in such a debate many of the principles discussed here may be applied with profit.

It seems almost unnecessary to say that in a completed speech, as delivered, most of the lines of demarcation between the different divisions should be entirely obliterated, so far as the audience is concerned. One part should blend into the next, as one dissolving stereopticon view disappears and another comes in its place, but so smoothly and naturally that the spectators are unaware of the precise moment when one entirely disappears and the other appears.

Such a division, logically and skilfully

made, is not only of great assistance in retaining the attention of the audience, but it is also a wonderful aid to the memory of the speaker. No doubt every speaker who occupies a public platform and gives utterance to addresses which are worthy of attention, finds difficulty in remembering to say all the things which he intended, or desired, to say, and in the order in which he intended to utter them. This difficulty can never be removed entirely from extempore speech. The word extempore is used, of course, as indicating merely that the address is not read from a manuscript. By carefully subdividing the speech, however, each part is itself suggestive of the material which will be found therein. As the various parts follow in a logical and invariable sequence, the speaker takes up each one in its turn, without the necessity of spending an inordinate amount of time and effort in memorizing the arrangement of his address. Even though the speech is committed to memory, word for word,

this arrangement will be of great assistance. But the advisability of learning a speech so as to be able to repeat it by rote, is very doubtful. It is possible that on rare occasions such a practice may be followed with advantage. But the weight of opinion is against making the practice invariable.

III

INTRODUCTION, OR EXORDIUM

The first few sentences which a speaker utters before an audience, receive more universal and closer attention than anything which he may thereafter say on that particular occasion, no matter how successful his oration may be. This is a psychological fact which is easy to explain. Curiosity is one of the predominant characteristics of practically everybody. Stop on lower Broadway, during the crowded noon hour, and gaze persistently toward the sky. See how soon a crowd will gather, gazing skyward, which, shortly, will gain such proportions that it will be necessary to call the police to disperse it. Each individual is animated by curiosity to see what you see. So when a new speaker is introduced and begins to talk, the dullest and least attentive person in the audience listens,

out of sheer curiosity, to hear what this new speaker has to offer. This, then, is the very best opportunity the man on the platform will have to chain the attention of his audience to the subject which he has in mind. How idiotic to waste such a golden opportunity. What unadulterated folly to throw away this wonderful chance by actually directing the attention of the audience to some topic away from the main one which the speaker wishes to press home and as to which he desires to have the audience accept and act upon his recommendation. How unwise, then, to start a serious subject with a funny story. Just to the extent that the story has succeeded, exactly to that extent has the attention of the audience been distracted from the serious matter in hand, and it has been made that much harder to again focus their attention on this matter. They will wait for further funny stories and unless they are forthcoming there is a mental resentment, which requires Herculean

efforts and marked ability to overcome, to the extent of again directing intelligent attention to the serious questions under discussion. It is barely possible that the point of a funny story may contain the very essence of the serious argument and thus form a good introduction. But this rarely happens and the practice is dangerous.

Then if the funny introductory effort fails! This is a calamity greater than any public speaker can possibly understand. The golden opportunity of taking advantage of that fresh bloom of keen attention is withered and dead. More than that, the speaker must now overcome a feeling of resentment and disgust, before he can secure attention for the serious portions of his subject.

Wit and humor have their places on the public platform, even in serious speeches, but they must be used sparingly, and never in the form of a *digressive* funny story as part of the introductory sentences. The sole use of such anecdotes is

to illustrate and make more forceful a serious argument. Lincoln was the real master of this use of humorous stories. As when he was opposed in the adoption of some measure, for the reason, as his opponents urged, that it should not be adopted until they had had more experience in the matter, Lincoln retorted that the argument reminded him of Pat, who declared: "Sure, thim boots are so schmall I'll not be able to git thim on me feet 'till after I wear thim a while." But this was not part of Lincoln's introductory remarks. Moreover, Lincoln never used humorous stories in his real masterpieces. How out of place such a story would have been in the Gettysburg Speech, or in the Second Inaugural Address. Yet these two speeches are not only Lincoln's masterpieces, but they are among the masterpieces of the English language. Webster never, on any occasion whatsoever, used humorous stories; yet his orations are masterpieces for all time to come.

Notwithstanding it is spoken first, the introduction should be written last, at the time the speech is prepared. This is so necessarily, because the exordium should contain the very soul of the subject. Cicero said that it should contain the very "bowels" of the oration, and Quintillian agreed with him. No matter which figure is used, we know what is meant. We want something that will make the greatest impression on the minds of the audience at the time when they are most attentive and therefore most impressionable. These first sentences must be a table of contents, or an index, in oratorical form, to the subject which is to be discussed. It should be made attractive, if possible, but it must be comprehensive, concise and understandable. Long and involved sentences must be absolutely eliminated. Everything obscure must be clarified. The language must be simple and direct. This is no time to indulge in flourishes of rhetoric or figures of speech, however

much it may be deemed advisable to introduce such features later in the speech.

If the introduction is correctly worded and is used as herein suggested, the speaker has planted the germ of whatever success he may attain on that particular occasion, in the most favorable spot for its growth. The audience sees, in perspective, and in its most general features, the subject which is to be expounded. They wait with interest for the developments which are to follow, no matter whether they are hostile or friendly. If the hostility is of such a violent character as to refuse a courteous hearing at all, even at this early stage of the speech, no rules can help the speaker. If he is a genius, he may finally prevail, as did Henry Ward Beecher, in his Liverpool address. But I make no pretence of being able to point to rules which will overcome the difficulty under such extraordinary circumstances. Sometimes it is advisable to propitiate a less violently

hostile audience. Just how this can be done, on each occasion, must be left to the good sense of the speaker himself. The circumstances in each case are so varied, that special rules would be merely confusing. There is one thing to avoid, however. Fulsome flattery never accomplishes this object.

There are two foolish practices which are so common as to be utterly tiresome. That is, first, the making of excuses, and second, the flippant remark that the speaker knows nothing about the subject of his address, which he supposes is the reason why he was called upon to speak on that topic. If a speaker really does not know anything about the subject under discussion, he shows his very great lack of good sense in permitting himself to be induced, under any circumstances whatsoever, to discuss it before an audience. He is sure to make himself ridiculous sooner or later, if he attempts to do it. It is entirely unnecessary for him to advise the audience that he has

no knowledge of the subject, because the audience will discover it soon enough, and why rub it in? If he actually has knowledge of the subject, but thinks it is witty to make the remark which is heard so often, he makes a more serious error than he probably realizes. The very minute he tells his audience that he does not know anything about the subject under discussion, a very large majority of them will take him at his word, and thereafter pay little or no attention to anything which he may have to say. They resent being talked to by a man who, by his own admission, does not know what he is talking about. They refuse to be persuaded by anything which he may say on the subject, because they feel that the speaker is not an authority. On the other hand, if the speaker is silent as to his own knowledge of the subject, the audience will take it for granted that he is familiar with it, otherwise he would not be requested to address them. In this frame of mind they will be ready to

accept many of his statements as being authoritative, whereas, if he flippantly tells them he does not know anything about the subject, they will not follow him at all, and his efforts are almost always doomed to failure.

The foolish practice of making excuses on one subject and another, at the beginning of an address, is very common. especially among inexperienced speakers. The occasions are so very rare in which it is advisable, or necessary, to make any excuse whatsoever, that the only safe rule to follow is never to make excuses. They weaken the speaker in the minds of the audience, almost invariably. When a man rises before an audience and tells them that since the chairman of the meeting asked him to make the address he has been very busy, or has been on the road, or has been ill, or for any other of a thousand reasons he has been unable to give the attention to the subject which he would like to have given, and which it deserves, the impression is made on the

mind of each auditor before him, that what he has to say is not well considered or authoritative. The speaker therefore handicaps himself. He may perhaps succeed in spite of his handicap, but the handicap is there nevertheless, and it may be just sufficient to turn the scales and make the speech a failure instead of a success. The best way is never to go on the platform unless you are reasonably well prepared, and then make no excuses, but do the best you can. You are only making trouble for yourself by offering excuses and you do not smooth your own way by this practice, however much your inclination may lead you in that direction.

Webster's introduction in his great argument, before the United States Supreme Court, in the Dartmouth College Case, was a model of conciseness and brevity. It also contained the very soul of his contention. In fact it was the whole point of the case around which all the arguments revolved. Moreover it con-

tained the essential germ of one of the most important constitutional decisions in relation to corporations that has ever been made in this country. Webster's first words were:

“The general question is, whether the acts of the 27th of June, and the 18th and 26th of December, 1816, are valid and binding on the rights of the plaintiffs, *without their acceptance or assent.*”

He proceeded then immediately to show that a corporate charter had been granted to Dartmouth College, giving it certain rights in relation to internal management, and that these rights had been taken away by the subsequent legislation, which was attacked as unconstitutional, *because the College had not assented to have its charter thus changed.* The Court followed Webster's reasoning and adopted the important principle that a corporate charter is a contract which is held inviolate under the clause in the Federal Constitution prohibiting a state

from passing an act violating the obligation of a contract.

The very soul of Lincoln's Gettysburg address was certainly contained in the first two sentences:

"Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this Continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation, so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure."

This surely was a fitting introduction to an address ending with that splendid peroration: "that government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

Thomas B. Reed, in closing the debate on the Wilson-Tariff Bill, admirably stated the point of his entire argument in the three sentences with which he opened his address. He said:

“In this debate, which has extended over many weeks, one remarkable result has already been reached, a result of the deepest importance to this country. That result is, that the bill before us is odious to both sides of the House. It meets with favor nowhere, and commands the respect of neither party. On this side we believe that while it pretends to be for protection it does not afford it, and on the other side they believe that while it looks toward free trade it does not accomplish it.”

The eloquent address of Henry W. Grady in New York, in 1886, on “The New South,” which brought him into immediate fame, contained, in the first two sentences, the very soul of his address. Mr. Grady’s opening remarks were as follows:

“There was a South of slavery and secession—that South is dead. There is a South of union and freedom—that South, thank God, is living, breathing, growing every hour.”

St. Paul's address on Mars Hill contains a more ancient example of the same practice. Paul's opening words were:

"Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious. For as I passed by, and beheld your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription 'TO THE UNKNOWN GOD.' Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, Him I declare unto you."—Acts, XVII, 22-23.

The bowels of Patrick Henry's speech before the House of Burgesses was contained in the third or fourth sentence of his introduction:

"The question before the House is one of awful moment to this country. For my own part, I consider it as nothing less than a question of freedom or slavery."

This was an apt introduction to that burning peroration:

"I know not what course others may

take; but as for me, give me liberty, or give me death!”

For a considerable time Henry Ward Beecher was not permitted to speak, so turbulent and hostile were the audience, at Liverpool. But when he could make himself heard his first words were:

“For more than twenty-five years I have been made perfectly familiar with popular assemblies in all parts of my country except the extreme south. There has not, for the whole of that time, been a single day in my life when it would have been safe for me to go south of Mason and Dixon’s Line, in my own country, and all for one reason—my solemn, earnest, persistent testimony against that which I consider to be the most atrocious thing under the Sun; the system of American slavery in a great free Republic.”

These sentences not only contained the bowels of Beecher’s Address, but they were courageous words, in the face of so violently hostile an audience as the one which he faced, and they did much to win for him a hearing.

IV

STATEMENT OF FACTS OR NARRATION

The narration, or statement of facts, should be an immediate expansion of the principal idea as expressed in the introduction. Its purpose is to give to the audience a clear understanding of the basic facts on which the argument is to be constructed. Here again great clarity should prevail. Unless the audience clearly understand the facts forming the basis of the speaker's contention they may miss the point of the argument entirely, a little later on. Of course, this statement must be as concise as comprehensiveness and clearness will permit. If it is too long and an undue attention is paid to details the attention of the audience will be lost. The result of this will be that they will not thoroughly understand the matter and when the speaker comes to the point of stating his

proposition, immediately after the narration, the audience will not be in a mental condition to give the proper attention to it, and the address becomes more or less obscure. The cumulative effect of losing the attention of an audience at a critical point in a speech, not infrequently spells complete failure.

The narration should be made as interesting as possible. Even a dry subject may be made interesting, almost invariably, by careful preparation. It should follow the introduction naturally and logically. Then if the introduction has been of such a character as to focus attention on the subject in hand, and the narration has made the principal facts clear and easily understandable, the audience is in a proper mental condition to grasp the principal proposition, which should immediately follow the statement.

There is necessarily a somewhat clear line of demarcation at this point. But the proposition follows so logically and naturally after the narration that those

in the average audience do not think of the division of the speech at all.

In fact the narration should be so arranged that a climax is reached just before the proposition is propounded. If the facts narrated by the speaker are such that an ordinary audience of reasonable and fair-minded human beings would say that such a condition ought not to be permitted to exist, there arises in the minds of the audience, as they listen to the narration, individually, and it might almost be said collectively, the question: Well, what do you purpose? In fact the audience is keen for your remedy. This is the psychological moment when the proposition should be presented. This is precisely the manner in which Webster and Macaulay handled their subjects in the two examples which are given below. A careful reading of these extracts shows indubitably that when the proposition came in each of these orations the listeners were waiting almost impatiently to hear what the

proposal was which the speaker had to make. Probably the audience, which consisted of the United States Supreme Court in one case and the House of Commons in the other, did not note the division of the speech at this point at all.

In Webster's Dartmouth College speech the proposition is in the form of a division and in Macaulay's address on Education it is a syllogism.

The division in Webster's great address is a good example of that kind of a proposition. The syllogism in Macaulay's speech is also an excellent specimen of a proposition of that character.

For the purpose of illustrating this point the introduction, narration and proposition from this great forensic of Webster's, before the United States Supreme Court, and from Macaulay's Parliamentary Address on Education are printed in full below. In Webster's speech the first paragraph in italics is the introduction and the last paragraph in

the extract given, also in italics, is the proposition.

“The general question is, whether the acts of the 27th of June, and of the 18th and 26th of December, 1816, are valid and binding on the rights of the plaintiffs, WITHOUT THEIR ACCEPTANCE OR ASSENT.

“The charter of 1769 created and established a corporation, to consist of twelve persons, and no more; to be called the ‘Trustees of Dartmouth College.’ The preamble to the charter recites, that it is granted on the application and request of the Rev. Eleazer Wheelock: That Doctor Wheelock, about the year 1754, established a charity school, at his own expense, and on his own estate and plantation: That for several years, through the assistance of well-disposed persons in America, granted at his solicitation, he had clothed, maintained, and educated a number of native Indians, and employed them afterwards as missionaries and schoolmasters among the savage tribes: That, his design promising to be useful, he had constituted the Rev. Mr. Whitaker to be his attorney,

with power to solicit contributions, in England, for the further extension and carrying on of his undertaking; and that he had requested the Earl of Dartmouth, Baron Smith, Mr. Thornton, and other gentlemen, to receive such sums as might be contributed, in England, towards supporting his school, and to be trustees thereof, for his charity; which these persons had agreed to do: And thereupon Doctor Wheelock had executed to them a deed of trust, in pursuance to such agreement between him and them, and, for divers good reasons, had referred it to these persons to determine the place in which the school should be finally established: And, to enable them to form a proper decision on this subject, had laid before them the several offers which had been made to him by the several governments in America, in order to induce him to settle and establish his school within the limits of such governments for their own emolument, and the increase of learning in their respective places, as well as for the furtherance of his general original design: And inasmuch as a number of the proprietors of lands in New Hampshire, animated by the example of the governor himself and others,

and in consideration that, without any impediment to its original design, the school might be enlarged and improved, to promote learning among the English, and to supply ministers to the people of that province, had promised large tracts of land, provided the school should be established in that province, the persons before mentioned, having weighed the reasons in favor of the several places proposed, had given the preference to this province, and these offers: That Doctor Wheelock therefore represented the necessity of a legal incorporation, and proposed that certain gentlemen in America, whom he had already named and appointed in his will to be trustees of his charity after his decease, should compose the corporation. Upon this recital, and in consideration of the laudable original design of Doctor Wheelock, and willing that the best means of education be established in New Hampshire, for the benefit of the province, the king granted the charter, by the advice of his provincial council.

“The substance of the facts thus recited is, that Doctor Wheelock had founded a charity, on funds owned and procured by himself; that he was at that time the sole dispenser and sole adminis-

trator, as well as the legal owner, of these funds; that he had made his will, devising this property in trust, to continue the existence and uses of the school, and appointed trustees; that, in this state of things, he had been invited to fix his school permanently in New Hampshire, and to extend the design of it to the education of the youth of that province; that before he removed his school, or accepted this invitation, which his friends in England had advised him to accept, he applied for a charter, to be granted, not to whomsoever the king or government of the province should please, but to such persons as he named and appointed, namely, the persons whom he had already appointed to be the future trustees of his charity by his will.

“The charter, or letters patent, then proceed to create such a corporation, and to appoint twelve persons to constitute it, by the name of the ‘Trustees of Dartmouth College;’ to have perpetual existence, as such corporation, and with power to hold and dispose of lands and goods, for the use of the college, with all the ordinary powers of corporations. They are in their discretion to apply the funds and property of the college to the

support of the president, tutors, ministers, and other officers of the college, and such missionaries and schoolmasters as they may see fit to employ among the Indians. There are to be twelve trustees forever, *and no more*; and they are to have the right of filling vacancies occurring in their own body. The Rev. Mr. Wheelock is declared to be the founder of the college, and is, by the charter, appointed first president, with power to appoint a successor by his last will. All proper powers of government, superintendence, and visitation are vested in the trustees. They are to appoint and remove all officers at their discretion; to fix their salaries, and assign their duties; and to make all ordinances, orders, and laws for the government of the students. And to the end that the persons who had acted as depositaries of the contributions in England, and who had also been contributors themselves, might be satisfied of the good use of their contributions, the president was annually, or when required, to transmit to them an account of the progress of the institution and the disbursements of its funds, so long as they should continue to act in that trust. These letters patent are to be

good and effectual, in law, *against the king, his heirs and successors forever*, without further grant or confirmation; and the trustees are to hold all and singular these privileges, advantages, liberties, and immunities to them and to their successors forever.

“No funds are given to the college by this charter. A corporate existence and capacity are given to the trustees, with the privileges and immunities which have been mentioned, to enable the founder and his associates the better to manage the funds which they themselves had contributed, and such others as they might afterwards obtain.

“After the institution thus created and constituted had existed, uninterruptedly and usefully, nearly fifty years, the legislature of New Hampshire passed the acts in question.

“The first act makes the twelve trustees under the charter, and nine other individuals, to be appointed by the governor and council, a corporation, by a new name; and to this new corporation transfers all the *property, rights, powers, liberties, and privileges* of the old corporation; with further power to establish new colleges and an institute, and to apply

all or any part of the funds to these purposes; subject to the power and control of a board of twenty-five overseers, to be appointed by the governor and council.

“The second act makes further provisions for executing the objects of the first, and the last act authorizes the defendant, the treasurer of the plaintiffs, to retain and hold their property, against their will.

“If these acts are valid, the old corporation is abolished, and a new one created. The first act does, in fact, if it can have any effect, create a new corporation, and transfer to it all the property and franchises of the old. The two corporations are not the same, in anything which essentially belongs to the existence of a corporation. They have different names, and different powers, rights and duties. Their organization is wholly different. The powers of the corporation are not vested in the same, or similar hands. In one, the trustees are twelve, and no more. In the other, they are twenty-one. In one, the power is in a single board. In the other, it is divided between two boards. Although the act professes to include the old trustees in the new corporation, yet that was without their assent,

and against their remonstrance; and no person can be compelled to be a member of such a corporation against his will. It was neither expected nor intended that they should be members of the new corporation. The act itself treats the old corporation as at an end, and going on the ground that all its functions have ceased, it provides for the first meeting and organization of the new corporation. It expressly provides, also, that the new corporation shall have and hold all the property of the old; a provision which would be quite unnecessary upon any other ground, than that the old corporation was dissolved. But if it could be contended that the effect of these acts was not entirely to abolish the old corporation, yet it is manifest that they impair and invade the rights, property, and powers of the trustees under the charter, as a corporation, and the legal rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to them, as individual members of the corporation.

“The twelve trustees were the *sole* legal owners of all the property acquired under the charter. By the acts, others are admitted, against *their* will, to be joint owners. The twelve individuals

who are trustees were possessed of all the franchises and immunities conferred by the charter. By the acts, *nine* other trustees and *twenty-five* overseers are admitted, against their will, to dividethese franchises and immunities with them.

“If, either as a corporation or as individuals, they have any legal rights, this forcible intrusion of others violates those rights, as manifestly as an entire and complete ouster and dispossession. These acts alter the whole constitution of the corporation. They affect the rights of the whole body as a corporation, and the rights of the individuals who compose it. They revoke corporate powers and franchises. They alienate and transfer the property of the college to others. By the charter, the trustees had a right to fill vacancies in their own number. This is now taken away. They were to consist of twelve, and, by express provision, of no more. This is altered. They and their successors, appointed by themselves, were forever to hold the property. The legislature has found successors for them, before their seats are vacant. The powers and privileges which the twelve were to exercise exclusively, are now to be exercised by others. By one of the

acts, they are subjected to heavy penalties if they exercise their offices, or any of those powers and privileges granted them by charter, and which they had exercised for fifty years. They are to be punished for not accepting the new grant, and taking its benefits. This, it must be confessed, is rather a summary mode of settling a question of constitutional right. Not only are new trustees forced into the corporation, but new trusts and uses are created. The college is turned into a university. Power is given to create new colleges, and, to authorize any diversion of the funds which may be agreeable to the new boards, sufficient latitude is given by the undefined power of establishing an institute. To these new colleges, and this institute, the funds contributed by the founder, Doctor Wheelock, and by the original donors, the Earl of Dartmouth and others, are to be applied, in plain and manifest disregard of the uses to which they were given.

“The president, one of the old trustees, had a right to his office, salary, and emoluments, subject to the twelve trustees alone. His title to these is now changed, and he is made accountable to

new masters. So also all the professors and tutors. If the legislature can at pleasure make these alterations and changes in the rights and privileges of the plaintiffs, it may, with equal propriety, abolish these rights and privileges altogether. The same power which can do any part of this work can accomplish the whole. And, indeed, the argument on which these acts have been hitherto defended goes altogether on the ground, that this is such a corporation as the legislature may abolish at pleasure; and that its members have no *rights, liberties, franchises, property, or privileges*, which the legislature may not revoke, annul, alienate, or transfer to others, whenever it sees fit.

“It will be contended by the plaintiffs, that these acts are not valid and binding on them, without their assent,—1. Because they are against common right, and the constitution of New Hampshire. 2. Because they are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.”

Macaulay's Address on Education in the House of Commons, in 1847, was made in the course of a debate and the

opening sentences do not immediately point to the "bowels" of the address, as did Webster's in the Dartmouth College case. Webster, likewise, while in the Senate, made addresses in the course of debate which had introductions less concise than that found in his forensic masterpiece. Yet look at his great "Reply to Hayne" and see how he centred attention to his topic by showing, in the opening sentences, how far afield the previous speakers had gone from the subject actually presented for discussion. Macaulay's speech on Education, down to the proposition, is printed in full below. The real introduction is contained in the two sentences first italicised and the proposition is contained in the last paragraph of the extract reproduced, which is also in italics.

"You will not wonder, Sir, that I am desirous to catch your eye this evening. The first duty which I performed, as a member of the Committee of Council which is charged with the superintendence

of public instruction, was to give my hearty assent to the plan which the honourable member for Finbury calls on the House to condemn. I am one of those who have been accused in every part of the Kingdom, and who are now accused in Parliament, of aiming, under specious pretences, a blow at the civil and religious liberties of the people. It is natural therefore, that I should seize the earliest opportunity of vindicating myself from so grave a charge.

“The honourable member for Finbury must excuse me if, in the remarks which I have to offer to the House, I should not follow very closely the order of his speech. The truth is that a mere answer to his speech would be no defence of myself or of my colleagues. I am surprised, I own, that a man of his acuteness and ability should, on such an occasion, have made such a speech. The country is excited from one end to the other by a great question of principle. On that question the government has taken one side. The honourable member stands forth as the chosen and trusted champion of a great party which takes the other side. We expected to hear from him a full exposition of the views of those in

whose name he speaks. But, to our astonishment, he has scarcely even alluded to the controversy which has divided the whole nation. He has entertained us with sarcasms and personal anecdotes: he has talked much about matters of mere detail: but I must say that, after listening with close attention to all that he has said, I am quite unable to discover whether, on the only important point which is in issue, he agrees with us or with that large and active body of Non-conformists which is diametrically opposed to us. He has sate down without dropping one word from which it is possible to discover whether he thinks that education is or that it is not a matter with which the state ought to interfere. Yet that is the question about which the whole nation has, during several weeks, been writing, reading, speaking, hearing, thinking, petitioning, and on which it is now the duty of parliament to pronounce a decision. That question once settled, there will be, I believe, very little room for dispute. *If it be not competent to the state to interfere with the education of the people, the mode of interference recommended by the Committee of Council must of course be condemned. If it be the right*

and the duty of the state to make provision for the education of the people, the objections made to our plan will, in a very few words, be shown to be frivolous.

“I shall take a course very different from that which has been taken by the honourable gentleman. I shall in the clearest manner profess my opinion on that great question of principle which he has studiously evaded; and for my opinion I shall give what seem to me to be unanswerable reasons. I believe, Sir, that it is the right and the duty of the state to provide means of education for the common people. This proposition seems to me to be implied in every definition that has ever yet been given of the functions of a government. About the extent of those functions there has been much difference of opinion among ingenious men. There are some who hold that it is the business of a government to meddle with every part of the system of human life, to regulate trade by bounties and prohibitions, to regulate expenditure by sumptuary laws, to regulate literature by a censorship, to regulate religion by an inquisition. Others go to the opposite extreme, and assign to government a very narrow sphere of action. But the very narrowest sphere that ever was assigned

to governments by any school of political philosophy is quite wide enough for my purpose. On one point all the disputants are agreed. They unanimously acknowledge that it is the duty of every government to take order for giving security to the persons and property of the members of the community.

This being admitted, can it be denied that the education of the common people is a most effectual means of securing our persons and our property? Let Adam Smith answer that question for me. His authority, always high, is, on this subject, entitled to peculiar respect, because he extremely disliked busy, prying, interfering governments. He was for leaving literature, arts, sciences, to take care of themselves. He was not friendly to ecclesiastical establishments. He was of opinion, that the state ought not to meddle with the education of the rich. But he has expressly told us that a distinction is to be made, particularly in a commercial and highly civilised society, between the education of the rich and the education of the poor. The education of the poor, he says, is a matter which deeply concerns the commonwealth. Just as the magistrate ought to interfere for

the purpose of preventing the leprosy from spreading among the people, he ought to interfere for the purpose of stopping the progress of the moral distempers which are inseparable from ignorance. Nor can this duty be neglected without danger to the public peace. If you leave the multitude uninstructed, there is serious risk that religious animosities may produce the most dreadful disorders. The most dreadful disorders! Those are Adam Smith's own words; and prophetic words they were. Scarcely had he given this warning to our rulers when his prediction was fulfilled in a manner never to be forgotten. I speak of the No Popery riots of 1780. I do not know that I could find in all history a stronger proof of the proposition, that the ignorance of the common people makes the property, the limbs, the lives of all classes insecure. Without the shadow of a grievance, at the summons of a madman, a hundred thousand people rise in insurrection. During a whole week, there is anarchy in the greatest and wealthiest of European cities. The Parliament is besieged. Your predecessor sits trembling in his chair, and expects every moment to see the door beaten in

by the ruffians whose roar he hears all around the house. The peers are pulled out of their coaches. The bishops in their lawn are forced to fly over the tiles. The chapels of foreign ambassadors, buildings made sacred by the law of nations, are destroyed. The house of the Chief Justice is demolished. The little children of the Prime Minister are taken out of their beds and laid in their night clothes on the table of the Horse Guards, the only safe asylum from the fury of the rabble. The prisons are opened. Highwaymen, housebreakers, murderers, come forth to swell the mob by which they have been set free. Thirty-six fires are blazing at once in London. Then comes the retribution. Count up all the wretches who were shot, who were hanged, who were crushed, who drank themselves to death at the rivers of gin which ran down Holborn Hill; and you will find that battles have been lost and won with a smaller sacrifice of life. And what was the cause of this calamity, a calamity which, in the history of London, ranks with the great plague and the great fire? The cause was the ignorance of a population which has been suffered, in the neighbourhood of palaces, theatres,

temples, to grow up as rude and stupid as any tribe of tattooed cannibals in New Zealand, I might say as any drove of beasts in Smithfield Market.

“The instance is striking: but it is not solitary. To the same cause are to be ascribed the riots of Nottingham, the sack of Bristol, all the outrages of Ludd, and Swing, and Rebecca, beautiful and costly machinery broken to pieces in Yorkshire, barns and haystacks blazing in Kent, fences and buildings pulled down in Wales. Could such things have been done in a country in which the mind of the labourer had been opened by education, in which he had been taught to find pleasure in the exercise of his intellect, taught to revere his Maker, taught to respect legitimate authority, and taught at the same time to seek the redress of real wrongs by peaceful and constitutional means?

“*This then is my argument. It is the duty of government to protect our persons and property from danger. The gross ignorance of the common people is a principal cause of danger to our persons and property. Therefore, it is the duty of the government to take care that the common people shall not be grossly ignorant.*”

One of the reasons for selecting the two speeches from which the foregoing extracts have been taken for examples here is that they illustrate the two principal forms of propositions most often used. Webster employed the *division* of the subject and Macaulay used the *sylllogism*, as pointed out more at length in the next chapter.

V

PROPOSITION

While the introduction proper indicates the side of the question the speaker favors, and the general features of the entire subject, the proposition states more particularly the precise point which the speaker intends to prove. This may be done by a division of the subject, containing simple assertions, which was the method followed by Webster in the Dartmouth College forensic; or it may be in the form of a syllogism, which was the method employed by Macaulay, in the oration on Education. Sometimes these forms are combined. That is, one or more of the assertions in the division, may be stated subsequently in the form of a syllogism or of syllogisms.

The simple division needs no explanation. In Webster's great speech before the United States Supreme Court, in the

Dartmouth College case, he followed strictly the classical division herein discussed. His introduction was brief and pointed. It is discussed in Chapter III. His narrative or statement of facts was clear, concise and interesting. Then before entering upon the argument proper he said:

“It will be contended by the plaintiffs that these acts (of the Legislature) are not valid and binding on them without their assent,—

“1. Because they are against common right, and the Constitution of New Hampshire.

“2. Because they are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.”

The Justices of the Supreme Court thus had presented to them clearly and concisely the points which were to be argued by Mr. Webster.

The syllogism, perhaps, may not be so well understood, especially by younger speakers. It is hardly necessary to say that this form of stating a proposition

has been used since time immemorial and is still considered the most forcible way in which an argument can be made. It is simply a statement of two propositions or "premises" from which the third or "conclusion" inevitably follows, if both the premises are accepted, or are conclusively proved. Thus take the following simple syllogism:

All roads in Italy lead to Rome;

This is a road in Italy;

Therefore this road leads to Rome.

Or take another:

All planets revolve around the sun;

The earth is a planet;

Therefore the earth revolves around the sun.

The important points in the skilful use of the syllogism are, first, that the conclusion must inevitably follow the premises; and second, one premise, at least, should be such that the audience will accept its truthfulness and accuracy,

unquestionably. Thus the whole weight of the speaker's effort is employed to prove one premise. This clarifies the subject, holds the attention of the audience and if the speaker succeeds in establishing that one premise, to the satisfaction of his hearers, he has won his case.

Note how successfully Macaulay formulated his syllogism under the rules just suggested. His first premise was:

"It is the duty of the government to protect our persons and property from danger."

No one could dispute that proposition.

His second premise was:

"The gross ignorance of the common people is a principal cause of danger to our persons and property."

If this latter proposition is accepted, or conclusively proved, the conclusion inevitably follows that:

"It is the duty of the government to take care that the common people shall not be grossly ignorant."

Macaulay, therefore, quite properly proceeded to prove his minor premise. In order that the student may observe how well this task was performed, the entire argument following the proposition should be read.¹ Moreover, the same speech is instructive as an indication of the state of public education in Great Britain so short a time ago, comparatively, as 1847.

Great care should be taken that the syllogism is logically correct. If there is a defect in this respect the whole argument may fall to the ground and failure will follow, even though the speaker has the side of the question which ought to be sustained. While logic has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of the statements of facts, it has very much to do with the conclusion which is drawn therefrom. For example, logic is not concerned about the truth of the state-

¹ It may be found in "Speeches on Politics and Literature," *Everyman's Library*, p. 349, published by E. P. Dutton and Co.

ment that, "All planets revolve around the sun." This is a statement of fact which may or may not be true, but is assumed to be true for the purpose of applying the rules of logic to the syllogism. The same may be said of the minor premise that, "The earth is a planet." This may or may not be true, so far as logic is concerned. But if both of these premises are true then the logical conclusion inevitably follows that: "The earth revolves around the sun."

The same may be said of the other syllogism. The statement that "All roads in Italy lead to Rome" cannot be tested by logic. Nor can the minor premise that "This is a road in Italy." But if both of these premises are true, then, by the rules of logic, the conclusion is inevitably true that "This road leads to Rome."

But in the case of a less simple syllogism it might be easy to fall into a logical error. The practice of great care in this respect, in regard to the speaker's own

proposition, will help him to discover fallacies in those of his opponent. This is not always an easy matter. Or, rather, it is sometimes easy to discover the fallacies, but it is not so easy to demonstrate to an audience that they are fallacies. Suppose, for example, we should take either of the two simple syllogisms stated above and convert it into a fallacy, as follows:

All roads in Italy lead to Rome.

This road leads to Rome.

Therefore this is a road in Italy.

The above syllogism is baldly fallacious. You understand it perfectly almost as soon as you read it. Suppose we treat the other example in like manner, as follows:

All planets revolve around the sun.

The earth revolves around the sun.

Therefore the earth is a planet.

This is equally fallacious and the reader appreciates the fallacy as soon as he examines it. But to appreciate the difficulty of clearly explaining to an

audience the fallacy in an opponent's reasoning, let the student thus try to explain, to an imaginary audience, the fallacy in either one of the foregoing examples, on the spur of the moment.

As a matter of fact the fallacy is often either ingeniously, or carelessly, or ignorantly concealed in persuasive statements, which seem reasonable and plausible.

The syllogism is rarely stated as plainly and baldly as are the examples given. It is more often stated in what may be called an oratorical form. Thus one element of the syllogism may be omitted entirely, in the actual speech, as made. The major premise may be so well understood as to require no statement at all. In such a case it is merely necessary to state the minor premise and perhaps the conclusion. Thus, also, in many arguments, if the major premise is clearly understood and assented to by the audience, it may be that the statement and proof of the minor premise alone may

show the conclusion so clearly and inevitably that it is better to allow the audience to draw the conclusion than to state it. Such a practice, however, is fraught with danger. The speaker having studied the subject thoroughly sometimes takes it for granted that the audience understand it better than they really do. Usually it is safer to state all three elements of the proposition, than to leave even one to the imagination of the audience, if there is any possible chance that a considerable number of those in the audience will not understand it.

VI

ARGUMENT AND PROOF

This is the place where the really heavy guns of the orator are brought into play. He has shown to the audience the facts which call for action and he has proposed the action which he advocates. Now he must justify his proposition. He must prove any facts as to which there is a doubt or a dispute. He must appeal to reason and possibly to passion. He must allay the feeling of fear, perhaps, which has been aroused by his opponent. This is the place where he must pile up his proof and arguments, tier on tier. For the purpose of getting the matter clearly in mind and making the argument comprehensive a brief may be made of the principal and subordinate points. This is a valuable aid to a classification of the material for the argument and proof. It is also an aid

to the memory in the delivery of the speech. A number of minor points may be proved by what might be termed auxiliary syllogisms. The opinions of others who are recognized authorities on the subject may be quoted. Reference may be made to authentic historical incidents. In fact the whole field of argumentation may be searched and its principles applied in this subdivision of the speech.

A novel thought or unexpected arrangement of words, so long as they are relevant, often reaches the hearers more forcibly than a plain statement would have done. Thus the figure known as the rhetorical paradox is sometimes extremely effective. Of this kind is the saying that "A man who never makes mistakes never makes anything else."

Or the following:

"His Honor rooted in dishonor stood and faith, unfaithful, kept him falsely true."

But be careful of too great refinement or of phrases the meaning of which is not

reasonably clear. For example, logicians have argued that the maxim:

“There is an exception to every rule,” disproves itself. For if there is an exception to *every* rule there is an exception to *this* rule; and therefore there is one rule without an exception.

Such arguments carry little weight with the average audience in these matter-of-fact days.

One extremely effective mode of argument is to build up a pyramidal climax, or series of climaxes, of solid facts. If they *are* facts, are pertinent to the question under discussion and are properly arranged and enumerated by the speaker in a forceful and animated manner, he can scarcely fail to win the approval of his audience. Such a plan greatly excels any wordy climax, however eloquent, from a purely rhetorical point of view, of irrelevant words, sentences and ideas.

Thus take the liquor question, which probably lends itself to this treatment as well as any which could be discussed.

Start with a broad foundation, which will support everything which follows:

The use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage is the greatest scourge known to mankind.

It is excessively expensive, extremely injurious to health, thus greatly shortening the lives of even moderate drinkers; it dulls the brain and thus decreases efficiency; it lowers the whole moral tone, causes untold poverty and misery and is responsible for most of the crime and insanity which are a reproach to a civilized community.

I said it was excessively expensive. In the United States alone the enormous sum of \$1,700,000,000 is spent annually for intoxicating liquors. The Panama Canal cost \$400,000,000, but the payments covered a period of more than ten years. With the sum spent for intoxicating liquors we could build four Panama Canals each year for ten years, or forty in all, and then have a billion dollars left over as a nest egg with which they

could be operated. People complain of the \$250,000,000 spent annually by the United States on the Army and Navy, including new battleships. With the amount spent for intoxicating liquors we could have seven armies and navies of equal size.

I said it was injurious to health. The life insurance statistics show that non-drinkers live on the average from twenty-five to thirty-three per cent longer than moderate drinkers. The mortality among heavy drinkers is enormous. Recent figures compiled from the experience of forty-two of the large life insurance companies covering the last twenty-five years show that should Russia continue to enforce the recent ordinance against the use of intoxicating liquors a loss of 500,000 men in the present (1914) war would be actually made up in ten years by the greater longevity of the remainder of the male population. It has been stated in the British Parliament recently, that the efficiency of the Russians, as a

nation, had been increased from thirty to fifty per cent, by the total abstinence decree. In fact, alcohol burns the lining of the stomach, injures the liver, destroys the kidneys, irritates the intestines and bladder, hardens the veins and arteries, weakens the heart and makes flabby the muscles generally.

I said it dulls the brain. We have all witnessed or perhaps some of us have experienced this effect. Targets were recently distributed among the soldiers of some of the European armies showing what poor shots were invariably made by men after partaking of even small amounts of liquor although the same men were crack shots when free from intoxicants, and had previously been in the habit of drinking moderately. Elaborate tests have been made in other places with hundreds of men, setting type and typewriting. Men who were in the habit of taking a moderate amount of intoxicants were given the same amount and their work compared as to accuracy and

quantity with their efforts when entirely free from intoxicants. Non-drinkers and immoderate drinkers were tested in the same way in a long series of experiments. In practically every instance the men after drinking *imagined* they were doing better and more work and in every instance they did poorer and less work than when free from liquor entirely.

We not infrequently hear it said that a man could not possibly have committed some atrocious crime with which he is charged unless he had been drunk. In fact, the lowering of the moral tone from drink is so well known as to need no citation of specific instances.

All authorities who have made any study of the subject agree that crime and insanity are due very largely to the direct and indirect effects of drinking intoxicating liquors. In Kansas where they have for a number of years actually had a prohibition law which really prohibits drink crime and insanity have decreased to an enormous extent.

No man, woman or child was ever injured to the slightest extent by total abstinence from intoxicating liquor, while for its use billions of wealth have been wasted, and untold misery, suffering and deaths have been caused. Considered from an industrial point of view alone, in the fact that billions upon billions have been paid to workmen for the manufacture of the liquor itself and the bottles, corks, casks and hundreds of other accessories used in the traffic, together with the establishments where it is dispensed, this, in a way, is all wasted, because it does not tend to the final betterment of the race, nor to any general progress, but in the other direction. Nations progress in spite of intoxicating liquor, not because of any industrial or other benefits flowing from its use.

VII

REFUTATION

While refutation is an element in the great majority of serious speeches, it is not always present. In legal arguments, before either court or jury, refutation plays an important part. It is frequently more difficult to prove a negative than it is a positive. Thus when a witness has testified to a certain set of facts he has produced a picture in the minds of the jurors. Even though the testimony of this witness is false in every essential particular nevertheless he has created a mental picture, which must be obliterated by negative testimony. It is difficult to wipe out every trace of this falsehood.

Take an ordinary negligence action, for example. A witness for the plaintiff testifies that he saw the plaintiff getting off a trolley car and just as he had one foot on the ground the car was pre-

maturely started and the plaintiff was thrown to the ground. This testimony creates a picture in the minds of the jurors, because the story is easily understandable by them. Suppose it is not true and the defendant's counsel is certain it is not true. He refutes it in many ways by testimony of other witnesses who were present when the alleged injury occurred. He produces others who swear that the plaintiff's witness was in another place at the time of the accident. On cross examination, possibly, he catches the witness in contradictory statements. But in the end the case stands that there is a direct conflict of testimony on the one important point on which it probably will turn. This is the place where the skilful use of refutation, in summing up the evidence, will be of great assistance. In a desperate case, such as suggested, it calls for the best there is in the speaker. All departments of oratory may be called into play, not infrequently without success.

Sometimes the refutation is mingled with the general argument. Often it is placed earlier in the speech. There is no hard and fast rule which can be applied invariably on this subject. It is the one part of a speech, perhaps, with which more liberty can be taken than any other, so far as its chronological order is concerned.

There may be no direct refutation at all. Instead of attempting to tear down his opponent's structure the speaker may think it more advantageous to build an argumentative structure which over-towers that of his opponent. Thus he may concede many of his opponent's assertions, but show that there are other considerations vastly more important. For example, in a discussion of the old, but always important, question of the tariff on goods imported from foreign countries, suppose you are arguing in favor of a protective tariff and your opponent has declared for substantial free trade, or a greatly reduced tariff.

Doubtless one of the arguments will be that a low tariff will decrease the cost of living, because many manufactured articles, which are used in large quantities, can be purchased in European markets cheaper than they can be secured in America. You may readily concede this point. But the real question is the *relative* cost of living. The very minute we begin to bring articles from other countries we must be able to produce the same article at home for a price as low as that for which it can be brought here from abroad. Otherwise our own manufacturers must go out of business. That is a mere truism. Roughly speaking, the cost of producing a manufactured article is divided into two parts, namely, the cost of the raw material and the labor expense. If the market for the raw material is open to the buyers of the world, on approximately equal terms, the manufacturer who can secure the cheapest labor controls the market, under ordinary circumstances. We know per-

fectly well that the wage scale in most of the countries with which we compete in relation to manufactures, is from thirty to fifty per centum only of that prevailing in the United States. In producing an article requiring the use of raw material which may be purchased on approximately equal terms by the manufacturers of the world, therefore, American labor must be contented with approximately the same wages that are paid in countries with which our manufacturers compete, otherwise our manufacturers must go out of business. This also is a mere truism. The cost of articles of competitive manufacture, under the circumstances narrated, therefore, cannot be reduced without also decreasing the wages of labor employed in those industries. The real question is, therefore, whether the readjustment, which is inevitable with a law tariff, will leave the *relative* cost of living higher or lower than it was before the tariff reduction. Our industrial system has been built up on a

protective tariff basis. The lowered tariff will affect different industries in various degrees. During the readjustment period labor in the industries which are affected the most will have a serious struggle. This is inevitable. Strikes and lockouts will probably result. The great European War has postponed the industrial struggle in this country, by making competition almost impossible on the part of some at least of our keenest competitors. The enormously increased imports before the war started foreshadow the conditions which will prevail when peace is established. Unless the readjustment has already been accomplished when peace is declared, an industrial conflict is sure to follow in America. Just what form that conflict will take no man can safely predict. Nor can any man say whether or not, in the end, the *relative* cost of living will be higher or lower in America when the protective basis on which our industrial system has been established is destroyed.

The truth of it is we are making a tremendously important change without knowing how we shall come out eventually. While the change is being accomplished much suffering must inevitably result from the confusion and uncertainty with which it will be attended.

The foregoing, of course, is only a small portion of the argument pro and con, on the tariff question. It is given merely as an example of refutation by overshadowing arguments. All persons would not be willing to concede that a lowered tariff would reduce the cost of living at all and they might possibly support that view by direct refutation. What has been said is merely an example of argumentation, not an expression of views, which would be entirely out of place in a book of this character.

VIII

CONCLUSION OR PERORATION

The experienced general sends forward his best and bravest troops to make the final charge, so his army may be victorious, after the long preceding struggle. The siege howitzers have boomed, shrapnel has burst, machine guns have played with deadly effect on the enemy, but whether the result at last shall be a victory or a defeat depends on the final onslaught. Thus, also, it is with an orator. After he has introduced his subject, narrated his facts, stated and proved his proposition and refuted his opponent's arguments, he comes to the final appeal by which he seeks to inspire action. It is like the brilliant charge in which the soldiers seem to throw discretion to the winds and, in their irresistible onrush, to carry everything before them. Like the soldier the speaker is engaged in

no dress parade affair, nor does this portion of his speech admit of any excursive digressions. As the soldiers must usually charge directly in the face of the enemy, so must the speaker make a frontal attack on the question under discussion. Fine phrases and other verbal embellishments are all very well, but unless they are strictly relevant and material to the object of the address they are worse than useless. If they are of such a character as to take the mind of the audience away from the subject under discussion they tend to turn into a defeat what otherwise might have been a successful endeavor. The speaker may use as many fine phrases as he pleases so long as they are clear, forceful and relevant. If they lack any one of these characteristics they should be discarded ruthlessly.

When Patrick Henry, in his courageous and patriotic address before the House of Burgesses, in the speech which caused so much consternation, declared: "I know not what course others may take;

but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!" every word had a weighty meaning. These phrases have become so well known, from constant repetition, that they are not infrequently used with a meaning which is anything but serious. But they would not have lived at all if they had not had a serious meaning when they were uttered. In sober truth, liberty for the American Colonist, or death for the ringleaders of the Revolution, were the only alternatives. Of this fact those who heard Patrick Henry were perfectly well aware. That was why his words made such a deep impression. They were the very soul of his oration. That is why they have lived until to-day and have become so common and trite by constant repetition.

Note the weight and pertinency of the closing words of Webster's peroration in the "Reply to Hayne"—not liberty first and union afterwards, but, "*Liberty and union, now and forever, one and inseparable!*" The whole of Webster's

patriotic appeal was contained in these last words. They were weighty because they were pertinent. Webster was endeavoring to prevent threatened secession on the part of some of the States, and his whole endeavor was to prevent a breaking up of the Union, and yet retain that liberty which the Union had secured for the people of the new Nation.

Think of Lincoln's wonderful appeals in the Gettysburg Speech and the Second Inaugural Address. His words were effective principally because they were peculiarly pertinent to the matter under discussion. At Gettysburg he declared that this new Nation "conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal," was on trial. The world was waiting to see whether or not a nation "so conceived and so dedicated" could long endure. Then he made that wonderful final appeal, that from the honored dead who had fallen on that terrible battlefield his countrymen should take increased devo-

tion to the cause represented by the declaration that a "government of the people, by the people and for the people shall not perish from the earth."

So the final words of the Second Inaugural Address show not only a noble spirit but they also were keenly pertinent to the matter in hand:

"With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right,—let us strive on to finish the work we are in: to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphan; to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations."

IX

ADDENDUM

Stick to your subject. Do not tell a good story merely because it is a good story, but only when it illustrates, or in some way enforces, a point which you desire to make. An audience will forgive the absence of humor much more quickly than it will digressions which confuse the principal theme under discussion. If you happen to know humorous anecdotes, which vividly illustrate your points, use them by all means, to a limited extent, but do not drag them in by the heels. The delivery of a string of funny stories, which have no significance except that they *are* funny stories, will gain very little permanent or valuable reputation for anyone, except vaudeville actors, or other professional humorists, and it is scarcely necessary to say that this book is not for them. Such a practice, which is

indulged in by some so-called after-dinner speakers, has not won for them much valuable glory or reputation. Mark Twain was an ideal after-dinner speaker, but he stuck to his text almost invariably and his wit and humor were incidental to a more or less serious theme. Besides, Mark Twain was a professional humorist.


Never forget that an address must be interesting at all times.

Never overstate your own case, nor depend on the supposed weakness of your opponent or his case.

Seek the truth always.

Don't imagine you are clever because you can argue on either side of a specific question. There is one side on which you cannot argue effectively, because you do not believe it. It is better not to argue at all than in favor of some proposition as to which, in your private heart, you do not subscribe; the advice of several respectable authorities to the contrary notwithstanding.

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